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ABSTRACT 
This Article studies three scandals that embroiled U.S. financial 
markets during the past decade or so, including the Nasdaq market-
makers’ use only of odd-eighths quotes, the abuse of specialist 
power on the New York Stock Exchange, and the mutual fund 
scandal. We attempt to attribute the resolution of these situations to 
the curative effects of markets versus regulation. We argue that the 
intervention of the legal system through regulation and/or litigation 
is often necessary to help resolve the misalignment of incentives 
needed for markets to accomplish their goal of maximizing value. 
The Article suggests that there exists an important synergy between 
financial markets and law that is often overlooked.  
The scandals that washed over Wall Street in recent years provoked 
dramatic shifts in the structure of our capital markets. Some of these 
changes reflect shifting incentives driven by the amazing technological 
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advances of the last two decades. Others have taken place in response to a 
legal or regulatory stimulus from government or private litigants. This 
Article seeks to examine the relative corrective power of markets versus 
law using three well-known episodes that occurred in the financial markets 
in the last decade or so: the odd-eighths controversy in the Nasdaq market 
in the mid 1990s; the challenges to the conduct of specialists on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE); and the abuses in mutual fund trading that 
flared in 2003. Law and markets frequently trade off in terms of their 
effectiveness in constraining such conduct. By examining these episodes, 
we seek to identify the characteristics that would lead us to choose one 
over the other as the preferred policy response to such scandals, and to 
understand whether a synergy exists between law and finance in unlocking 
value creation.  
There is a natural friction between lawyers and economists visible in 
the different perspective each brings to respond to market frictions. In the 
same way, we might expect that the preferred solution of a surgeon faced 
with a medical condition would be to recommend surgery, a holistic 
doctor would recommend non-invasive approaches, while advice sought 
from a person of faith would emphasize the power of prayer. When the 
spotlight falls on our financial markets, economists are inclined to see the 
marvelous self-corrective power of markets; the surge of private activity in 
response to price signals pushes the development of the economy in ways 
that any regulator will have difficulty duplicating. Barring monopolies 
bestowed by government, economists expect markets to compete away 
inefficiencies. Yet, for those trained in the law, it is the market failure that 
will catch their eye and provoke a response that seeks to mold or overturn 
the failure through regulation. In turn, those market participants subject to 
the reach of the law are inclined to ponder whether the legal system 
produces a better result than the market. Do the costs of regulation 
(monies paid in allegedly frivolous lawsuits come readily to mind) exceed 
the benefits?  
We approach this question from two perspectives, one of us trained in 
economics and the other in law, having for several years co-taught a class 
that includes both law and MBA students. We have found that unlocking 
the full power of financial markets sometimes requires the presence of 
legal action to break down artificial barriers or to rid the market of 
practices harmful to the operation of the market. In approaching these 
issues, we have taken the perspective that the least obtrusive pecking order 
is to permit markets the opportunity to resolve inefficiencies or frictions 
through the forces of competition. Only after markets fail to produce 
value-maximizing solutions will the need for regulation and/or litigation 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/1
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be a viable and relevant intervention. Barriers to resolution other than a 
legal one could include government protection or natural monopolies that 
preclude competition, the existence of strong entrenched interests, norms 
that resist change, and the presence of hidden markets that perpetuate 
illegal or anti-competitive behavior. Our three examples share the common 
theme that our financial markets benefited from the intervention of the 
legal system either through government regulation or private litigation. 
The main goal of our Article is to better understand why markets alone 
were unable to unlock their full potential and how the intercession of 
regulation and/or litigation spurred the changes necessary to resolve the 
inefficiencies. 
The Article is organized as follows: Part I presents our analysis of the 
Nasdaq odd-eighths pricing convention and ensuing market structure 
changes including the SEC Order Handling Rules; Part II describes the 
interaction between law and finance in the context of the series of events 
at the NYSE that began with a questionable pattern of trading by 
specialists and ended with the NYSE’s decision to purchase Archipelago 
and go public; Part III explores the legal and economic resolution to the 
mutual fund trading scandal in 2003–2004; and Part IV offers our 
conclusions.  
I. THE NASDAQ ODD-EIGHTHS PRICING CONVENTION 
A. The Problem: Why Didn’t Market Makers Use All of the Price Points 
in Setting Their Quotes? 
Equity markets are two-sided markets in which intermediaries stand 
ready to either buy or sell. In such markets, which are also common for 
currency exchanges, used cars, and scalped tickets for sporting events, the 
intermediary quotes a bid (the price at which the intermediary is willing to 
buy) and an ask (the price at which the intermediary is willing to sell). The 
difference between the two is the spread. This difference is the investor’s 
cost of a round-trip purchase/sale in the stock, and it is a common way of 
measuring costs of participating in a market. It is also the intermediary’s 
return for standing ready to make a market. Economic factors can cause 
the bid-ask spread to be larger or smaller, depending on risk factors such 
as the volume and volatility of shares traded in the market, the price of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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each share, and the likelihood that an intermediary will be trading against 
an informed insider.1  
Until recently, bid-ask prices in the United States were quoted in 
eighths of a dollar, reflecting a base 8 system that had been used since 
securities first began trading in New York in the late eighteenth century. 
This system used eight price points or tick sizes per dollar so that the 
minimum increment to a quoted bid or ask was an eighth of a dollar or 
$0.125. This also implied that the spread (and the intermediary’s profit) 
would be at least $0.125 even if economic conditions might support a 
narrower spread. 
Professors Christie and Schultz’s 1994 paper uncovered a pricing 
convention among Nasdaq market makers that inflated trading costs for 
investors by artificially widening the quoted bid-ask spread.2 Specifically, 
Christie and Schultz found that among seventy percent of the 100 most 
active Nasdaq stocks they studied in 1991, market makers (as 
intermediaries in that market are usually labeled) only used the four even-
eighth quotes (1/4, 1/2, 3/4, and 1) when updating their bid-ask prices and 
avoided the use of odd-eighth quotes (1/8, 3/8, 5/8, and 7/8). As a result, 
the minimum bid-ask spread (and the intermediary’s profit) could not fall 
below $0.25 at a time when the minimum price increment was $0.125.3 
The Nasdaq pattern differed from that of stocks listed on the NYSE, where 
the participation of intermediaries is structured differently. In the older and 
larger American equity market, the same disparity between odd and even 
quotes did not emerge among a similar sample of actively traded NYSE 
issues.4  
B. Why Didn’t Markets Correct the Problem? 
The ability of market makers to coordinate their quotation patterns for 
the purpose of earning supra-competitive rents at first seems implausible. 
How could as many as sixty market makers in a given stock maintain such 
an agreement over a period of years when the costs of entry were 
 1. Any of these could change the risk of a market maker’s activity and under basic economic 
principles would lead to a broadening or narrowing of the spread to reflect such change in risk and 
return. See Hans R. Stoll, The Pricing of Dealer Security Services: An Empirical Study of Nasdaq 
Stocks, 33 J. FINANCE 1153 (1978). 
 2. William Christie & Paul Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth 
Quotes?, 49 J. FINANCE 1813–40 (1994). 
 3. The actual pricing convention adopted by the market makers stipulated that odd-eighth 
quotes were to be avoided when the individual dealer spread was $0.75 or wider, but that odd-eighth 
quotes were permissible when the individual dealer spread was less than $0.75. 
 4. See Christie & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1819.  
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relatively small? Why did the market not intervene through competition to 
eliminate these excess profits? We will argue that the answer lies in a 
failure of the market to police itself through self-regulation and in the 
presence of anti-competitive business practices that had developed over 
the years on Nasdaq. Among other things, (1) Nasdaq market makers did 
not include public limit orders in their displayed quotes, unlike the NYSE, 
where public limit orders provided a source of competition with 
intermediaries; (2) market structures and practices insulated order flow 
from price competition; (3) the market makers’ incentives to provide direct 
competition were blocked by National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) rules and by the public nature of price quotes that made it easy 
for renegade market makers to be identified and disciplined by peers; and 
(4) the industry, through Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), had little 
incentive to change these practices because of industry domination of the 
organization. Thus, the market was unable to unravel the anti-competitive 
forces, leaving the job to both private litigation and government 
regulation. The remainder of this part will provide a summary of the 
landscape facing the markets and regulators in the mid-1990s when this 
anti-competitive pricing convention surfaced. 
1. Exclusion of Public Limit Orders on Nasdaq 
Nasdaq has traditionally been described as a dealer market, where the 
intermediaries are principals who stand ready to buy or sell in transactions 
with individual customers.5 Multiple dealers make markets in individual 
Nasdaq stocks, with the founding principle that the dealers will compete 
for order flow by offering better prices. Dealers with the greatest need to 
purchase shares are willing to pay the highest price (inside bid) and the 
dealers with the greatest need to sell are willing to accept the lowest price 
(inside ask). The quotes of the various market makers are available to 
those in the market, and the best prices—the inside bid and inside ask—
are noted. 
The NYSE has traditionally been an open outcry auction market as 
opposed to a dealer market.6 The exchange names one specialist for each 
stock and all trades would be funneled to that specialist who exposes the 
 5. This is in contrast to an auction market when intermediaries may be acting as a broker or 
agent for the customer in executing a trade. See generally Hans R. Stoll, Principles of Trading Market 
Structure, 6 J. FINANCE SERV. RES. 76 (1992), for an in-depth discussion of trading market structure. 
 6. See Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 84 (1984) 
(discussing securities exchanges). 
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offer to quotes from various parties on the specialist’s book or in the 
“crowd” gathered in front of the specialist’s post on the exchange floor. 
Traditionally, the NYSE differed from Nasdaq in that members of the 
public could provide additional competition by placing limit orders that 
would be included in the specialist’s book. A limit order stipulates a price 
and quantity at which the investor is willing to transact. Investors placing a 
limit order to buy stock need only beat the inside bid by one price 
increment (12.5 cents at the time) to be at the front of the line when an 
incoming market order to sell arrives.7 Limit orders provide the public 
with direct access to the market and an opportunity to dictate the price at 
which they are willing to transact.  
For virtually all of Nasdaq’s history, limit orders had no standing. 
Nasdaq accepted the proposition that competition among market makers 
was sufficient to ensure competitive trading costs, and the public was not 
invited to the party. The exclusion of limit orders from Nasdaq may be 
justified in an openly competitive market where price truly dictated where 
orders would be executed.8 Unfortunately, in the case of the Nasdaq 
market of the mid-1990s, the market adopted a number of practices, 
discussed below, such as internalization, preferencing, and payment for 
order flow, that inhibited and discouraged price competition. Without the 
interjection of competition from the investing public, there was little 
option but to trade Nasdaq stocks at the prices dictated by the dealers.  
2. Insulating Order Flow from Price Competition 
Internalization, preferencing, and payment for order flow are all 
mechanisms for market makers to obtain order flow without posting the 
most competitive price. In that sense, these market participants can free-
ride on those who are taking the risk to post prices and thereby contribute 
to price discovery. Internalization occurs when a market making firm is 
vertically integrated with the brokerage house that routes retail orders 
received from investors to the Nasdaq market.9 Rather than route the retail 
order to the bidder offering the most competitive price, the market maker 
 7. A market order differs from a limit order in that it specifies a willingness to buy or sell the 
stock at the current market price. For a discussion of trading priority rules, see ROBERT SCHWARTZ, 
RESHAPING THE EQUITY MARKETS: A GUIDE FOR THE 1990S 39 (1991). 
 8. “The ultimate safeguard for the integrity of interdealer markets is often said to be the factor 
of competition among dealers.” H.R. REP. No. 88-95, pt. 2, at 661 (1963) (identifying a number of 
anticompetitive and manipulative practices in the over-the-counter markets of the day). 
 9. LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGE MARKETS MICROSTRUCTURE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 514 (2003). 
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internalizes the order, that is, the market maker enters into the trade as the 
counter-party to the customer. The practice is to use the best price 
currently available in the market as opposed to the market-maker’s own 
quotes, which may well be poorer than the best bid or offer. The retail unit 
can assure the customer that they received the “best” price at the time of 
execution as required by the broker/dealer’s obligation to obtain the best 
execution, but the market maker can obtain the order without the need to 
compete on the basis of price.  
Preferencing is another means of insulating order flow from price 
competition that permits market makers to exchange orders with one 
another.10 Suppose that market maker A makes a market in Microsoft and 
market maker B makes a market in Intel (market makers choose the stocks 
in which they make a market and do not make a market in all stocks). 
When market maker A receives a customer’s order to trade Intel, it routes 
the order not to the bidder offering the best price in the Intel market but 
rather to market maker B (who willingly executes the order at the best 
price available in the market). Conversely, market maker B will route its 
orders for Microsoft to market maker A for execution. This reciprocal 
arrangement allowed market makers to have orders routed to them without 
having to compete for the orders on the basis of offering the most 
competitive price. 
Payment for order flow is a controversial practice that allows market 
makers to essentially purchase order flow from retail brokers.11 Market 
makers will offer retail brokers rebates of one to two cents per share if the 
broker routes retail orders to them for execution. Market makers typically 
restrict the maximum size of any individual retail order to ensure that they 
are not trading against an informed investor, and they require a certain 
minimum number of shares per month from the broker. Through this 
arrangement, market makers again are able to secure order flow without 
having to compete for it on the basis of price.  
3. Regulation Limiting Competition 
Although many of the limitations just discussed arose from the 
structure of the market and the private ordering that evolved over time, 
other constraints reflected the impact of legal regulation. For example, the 
NASD created a rule that prevented market makers from posting quotes 
that were excessively wide relative to the inside spread. The Excess 
 10. Id. at 520. 
 11. Id. at 155. 
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Spread Rule prevented market makers from posting an individual dealer 
spread that was more than 125 percent of the width of the quotes for the 
average of the three dealers posting the narrowest spreads.12 Thus if three 
or more dealers sought to compete by using odd-eighths quotes, thereby 
narrowing the spread, the Excess Spread Rule would require that all other 
market makers narrow their individual spreads and adopt the use of odd-
eighths quotes to be in compliance with the rule. And once narrowed, it 
would take an extraordinary effort to move the spread back to its original 
width, since noncompliance by any three market makers would block the 
widening. The result was to create a large incentive to monitor quotes of 
other market makers and to put pressure on those might who deviate from 
the convention by offering narrower spreads.13
Similarly, the duty of best execution, a broker’s common law 
obligation to get the best price for a client, regulated market makers and 
was reinforced by SEC decisions and a NASD rule that required each 
market maker to match the best price available on the market when filling 
orders by internalization, preferencing, and/or payment for order flow 
discussed above. As a result, market makers who themselves did not quote 
the most competitive prices were especially sensitive to an outlier who 
sought to provide price competition that the other market makers would be 
forced to use for their own trade. Suppose that the inside spread was 
$0.25. If a market maker wishing to fill the next market order narrowed 
the spread to $0.125, this negatively impacted the profits for all market 
makers engaged in internalization, preferencing, and payment for order 
flow since all market makers must honor the new, narrower inside spread. 
Since the displays used by Nasdaq market makers provided the 
identification of the market maker narrowing the spread, the threat existed 
for retaliation.14  
 12. See NASD Notice to Members 97–76: Nasdaq Eliminates Express Spread Rule 4 (Nov. 
1997), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/file_store/Pdf/Rulebooks/nasa_9776.pdf. The Excess 
Spread Rule is discussed in the Appendix to the SEC’s 21(a) report on NASD and the Nasdaq market 
in 1994. Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the 
NASD and the Nasdaq Market, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nd21a-appx.txt 
[hereinafter 21(a) Report Appendix]. 
 13. See 21(a) Report Appendix, supra note 12, at 16 (other market makers understood that they 
were not supposed to break the spread). 
 14. See Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the 
NASD and the Nasdaq Market, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nd21a-report.txt 
[hereinafter 21(a) Report] (“Certain market makers also discouraged other market makers from 
narrowing the displayed quotes for smaller orders. Market makers that failed to follow these 
conventions were sometimes subject to harassment and unwillingness to trade by other market makers 
who were attempting to enforce compliance with this convention.”). The report notes, “There was 
widespread awareness among market makers of the harassing telephone calls . . . . Traders testified 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/1
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4. Barriers Limiting Collective Action by Self-Regulatory 
Organizations 
As a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) as defined by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,15 the NASD owned, operated and regulated the 
Nasdaq stock market, including monitoring of practices such as those 
described above. Collective action through that organization was possible 
to adjust some of the anticompetitive policies. However, both the NASD 
and Nasdaq were very insular, reflecting the interests of industry 
participants who were its members with little public representation. 
Effective self-regulation requires that the public have a vocal presence, if 
not a majority, on the board of directors of such entities. Such was not the 
case at either the NASD or Nasdaq. For each of the five years leading up 
to 1994, the Nasdaq Board contained no public representation, being 
totally controlled by industry members, and the board of directors of the 
NASD had less than thirty percent public representation.16 Thus, the 
corporate governance of both the parent organization and the market itself 
failed the public trust by excluding effective oversight of the market.  
C. Resolution 
The restoration of competition came in waves: 
• First, media coverage of the results of the academic study and its 
implications for anti-competitive practices generated publicity 
that led market makers of some of the biggest stocks traded on 
Nasdaq to begin using odd-eighths immediately.17  
• The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an 
investigation of the market and sought to understand how the 
self-regulation component of the NASD’s charter was being 
that the telephone calls were effective in deterring market makers from entering quotes that were 
inconsistent with the pricing convention and narrowed spreads.” Id. at 18. The Appendix contains a 
transcript describing market broadcast messages that criticized changes in dealer spreads. 21(a) Report 
Appendix, supra note 12, at 24. One market maker, in retaliation for another market maker’s 
narrowing the spread in Microsoft, in turn narrowed the spread in Cisco, where the second market 
maker was one of the largest volume traders.  
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(26) (2000). 
 16. NASDAQ, Inc., Report of the NASD Select Committee on Structure and Governance (Sept. 
15, 1995) at Appendix A [hereinafter the Rudman Report]. The Committee was appointed by the 
NASD Board of Governors in November 1994 in the wake of the odd-eighths scandal. 
 17. William Christie & Paul Schultz, Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers Stop Avoiding Odd-
Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FINANCE 1841, 1846–48 (1994) (charting the simultaneous collapse of effective 
spreads in five of the largest stocks traded on Nasdaq beginning on May 27, 1994). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1567 Christie Thompson book pages.doc 10/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1576 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1567 
 
 
 
 
 
 
discharged.18 The Rudman Committee, a NASD body charged 
with evaluating the organizational structure of NASD and 
Nasdaq in light of the investigations into the pricing convention, 
concluded in 1995 that the NASD should reorganize and reduce 
its board to eight members, five of whom would be drawn from 
the public sector.19 It also recommended the creation of a 
separate regulatory unit, NASD Regulation Inc., with a board of 
twenty-eight members that would be equally divided between 
industry and public representatives. In addition, the Nasdaq 
board was restructured to include sixteen members drawn 
equally from industry and the public. Thus, the second wave of 
reform came in the form of a restructuring of the corporate 
governance of both the parent (NASD) and the market (Nasdaq). 
• The broader SEC investigation led to a Section 21(a) Report 
accusing the NASD of negligence in the oversight of their 
market.20 The settlement that followed required the NASD to 
establish a $100 million fund to improve the oversight of its 
market so that such an episode would not be repeated.21 More 
importantly, the SEC promulgated a series of Order Handling 
Rules (OHRs) that required public limit orders to be included in 
quotes made available on the Nasdaq market and also required 
that quotes placed in certain proprietary systems among brokers 
known as ECNs (Electronic Communication Networks) be made 
available to all public investors.22 
• The Department of Justice began investigating the antitrust 
aspects of the pricing convention.23 After almost two years of 
investigation, the Justice Department settled with the market 
making firms over charges that the pricing convention was anti-
competitive and had harmed investors trading Nasdaq stocks.24 
 18. Richard S. Taylor & Warren Getler, Nasdaq Dealers are Being Investigated in a Separate 
Probe Launched by SEC, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1994, at A4. 
 19. See the results of the Rudman Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A, described in the 21(a) 
Report, supra note 14, at 10–12. 
 20. 21(a) Report, supra note 14. 
 21. 21(a) Report, supra note 14. The NASD consented to the settlement and the $100 million 
without either admitting or denying the allegations. Id. at 4. 
 22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-4 (2005). 
 23. Jeffrey Taylor & Warren Getler, U.S. Examines Alleged Price-Fixing on Nasdaq, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 20, 1994, at C1. 
 24. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Charges 24 Major Nasdaq 
Securities Firms with Fixing Transaction Costs for Investors (July 17, 1996) (on file with authors). 
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The Justice Department forbid firms from following the pricing 
convention, and provided both civil and criminal penalties for 
traders violating the terms of the settlement.  
• The largest financial settlement occurred in private class actions 
brought against the market makers.25 The civil litigation was 
settled on Christmas Eve 1997, with market making firms 
agreeing to pay investors a total of $1.027 billion.  
In our view, markets failed to adequately police themselves due to the 
self-interests of the market participants and their owner/regulators. The 
responsibility for resolving this anti-competitive scenario, then, fell to the 
legal system rather than the markets. When entrenched interests are so 
deeply grounded in their routines, and when market participants have little 
or no option to bypass these interests, regulation and/or litigation can 
produce a value-enhancing outcome.26 Indeed, the most important 
correction mechanism was provided by the SEC in the form of the OHRs27 
that allowed investors to place limit orders with their brokers that had to 
be reflected in the Nasdaq market quotes.28 Dealers setting bid and ask 
quotes then were forced to compete directly with the public orders, 
eliminating any and all opportunities to establish or retain a pricing 
convention that benefited the market makers at the expense of the public.29 
It was a simple but profound solution. In addition, the OHRs required that 
more competitive prices displayed by market makers in ECNs be 
accessible by the public.30 This action eliminated a two-tiered market 
where in one market, the private market used only by professionals, 
market makers routinely used all eight price fractions and traded at 
narrower spreads with each other and large institutions. In the Nasdaq 
 25. Professor Christie reports hearing from a leading plaintiff’s law firm by mid-day on the day 
the report of the study was published in the Los Angeles Times in May 1994. The 21(a) Report 
Appendix notes that on May 27, 1994, several class action lawsuits were filed against market makers 
that were consolidated in fall 1994. 21(a) Report Appendix, supra note 12, at n.42. 
 26. The deeply grounded nature of the conduct is reflected in the comment on a national business 
television program by an editor of Equities magazine who explained this behavior as resulting from 
teaching “rookies” how not to lose money. Marketplace (CNBC Television Broadcast 1994) (on file 
with authors). See also 21(a) Report, supra note 14, at nn.44, 47 (quoting trader who said he adhered 
to custom because he wanted to be accepted and because making a quarter point on a trade allowed 
you to make up for a multitude of sins). 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-4 (2005). 
 28. Id.  
 29. Lack of limit order competition distinguished the dealer markets from the auction markets, 
which also had payment for order flow and internalization, but did permit limit orders to be included 
and had lower effective spreads. 
 30. 17 CFR § 240.11A6(2) (2005). 
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market, conversely, the public was forced to transact at much wider 
spreads given the absence of odd-eighth quotes, thereby incurring much 
higher transaction costs.31  
What do these results tell us about the relative impact of markets and 
law? The immediate move to odd-eighth quotes in some high-profile 
stocks suggests a story consistent with market self-correction.32 Consistent 
with this hypothesis, a 1999 empirical study found that spreads in the 
Nasdaq market declined by one-third between the publication of the 
original Christie/Schultz study and the adoption of the OHRs.33 Publicity, 
in this case, opened the way for market makers to compete in a more open 
market. Yet the altered behavior of market makers did not occur in a 
vacuum. The suits themselves, or the threat of those suits, may have 
spurred the self-correction initially visible in the market. The weight of the 
investigations by the Justice Department and the SEC and the filing of 
over thirty class action suits were required to finally dismantle the anti-
competitive pricing convention.  
Publicity alone or publicity plus the threat of legal sanctions may have 
led market makers to use odd-eighth quotes, but it was government 
regulation that pushed the market to open the competition to public orders 
and to electronic trading that has led to even greater declines in quoted 
spreads. An empirical study revealed that spreads fell by another one-third 
after the effective date of the parts of the OHRs requiring public limit 
orders to be included in quotes. The evidence from that study also showed 
that about seventy percent of the decline in spreads could be attributed to 
the portion of the reform that required display of customer limit orders and 
the remaining thirty percent was due to the requirement of inclusion of 
more competitive ECN quotes.34 It is an important example of how the 
most efficient solution to a market problem is through litigation and 
regulation. Not all cases work so well. 
 31. 21(a) Report Appendix, supra note 12, at 10 (discussing fact that routine use of odd-eighths 
by market makers in quotes on Instinet and market makers trades among themselves and sometimes 
with institutional investors indicates that adherence to pricing convention was not the result of natural 
market forces). 
 32. See supra note 17. 
 33. Michael Barclay, William Christie, Jeffrey Harris, Eugene Kandel & Paul Schultz, Effects of 
Market Reform on the Trading Costs and Depths of Nasdaq Stocks, 54 J. FINANCE 1 (1999). 
 34. Id. at 15 tbl. 3. 
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II. ALLEGATIONS OF UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES BY NYSE SPECIALISTS 
A. The Problem: Increased Possibility of Specialist Abuse of the Trading 
Process Following the Move to Decimalization 
The traditional pattern of the NYSE has been to assign each stock to a 
specialist on the floor of the stock exchange and conduct an open outcry 
auction to obtain the best execution price for an order.35 The price for a 
stock is determined by competition among investors submitting limit 
orders, liquidity provided by floor brokers, and the trading interests of the 
specialist. The specialist seeks to match buy and sell orders (including 
public limit orders) left on the specialist’s order book. If the depth of the 
market does not permit matching, the specialist is obligated to use the 
specialist’s own liquidity to create a market.36 In addition to the 
competition from public limit orders, floor brokers circulate in the space in 
front of the specialists’ posts, offering to improve offers called out by the 
specialist. As a result, there is often price improvement in the executed 
price as compared to the quoted prices in the specialist’s book.37
In this setting, NYSE quotes tended to be evenly distributed among all 
ticks and the quoted inside spreads tended to be lower than traditional 
dealer markets.38 As the market moved to trading in one-sixteenths of 
dollars in 1997 (thus the minimum tick size moved to 6¼ cents from 12½ 
cents) and then to decimals in 2001 (one hundred ticks per dollar, so that 
the minimum change was now only one penny), new fissures were 
exposed in the specialist system.39
 35. See generally ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ & RETO FRANCIONI, EQUITY MARKETS IN ACTION: 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIQUIDITY, MARKET STRUCTURE & TRADING 14 (2004). The NYSE has now 
shifted much of its trading to an electronic platform. See Aaron Lucchetti, The NYSE: Faster (and 
Lonelier), WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007 at C1 (describing move to electronic trading). 
 36. Harris, supra note 9, at 496 (discussing specialists’ affirmative obligation to make a market). 
 37. Charles M. Lee, Market Integration and Price Execution on NYSE Listed Securities, 48 J. 
FINANCE 1009, 1030 tbl. 7 (1993). 
 38. Hendrick Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs and the Market Quality after 
Decimalization, 38 J. FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 747 (2003); Hendrick Bessembinder, 
Trade Execution Costs on Nasdaq and the NYSE: A Post-Reform Comparison, 34 J. FINANCIAL AND 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 387 (1999). 
 39. See Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs on Nasdaq over NYSE: A Post Reform 
Comparison, supra note 38, for a discussion of the comparison in trading costs between Nasdaq and 
the NYSE in the post-Order Handling Rules era, and Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs and the 
Market Quality after Decimalization, supra note 38, for a similar comparison after the adoption of 
decimal trading. The role of tick size and its impact on the trading arena are studied in Lawrence 
Harris, Minimum Price Variations, Discrete Bid-Ask Prices, and Quotation Sizes, REVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL STUDIES 7, 149–78 (1994), and Lawrence Harris, Stock Price Clustering and Discreteness, 
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 4, 389–415 (1991). 
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First, as the markets moved to trading in sixteenths and then in penny 
price increments, the price improvement needed before an intermediary 
could step in front of existing orders to trade on its own behalf and still 
meet its duty of best execution declined dramatically. At the same time, 
the costs and benefits of sending an order to the floor of the stock 
exchange for the possibility of receiving price improvement via exposure 
to the open outcry auction system shifted dramatically. The amount of 
price improvement when price increase occurred in pennies versus 12.5¢ 
increments was much less valuable, and investor time horizons were 
shrinking so that the additional time necessary to send orders to the floor 
carried a greater cost. Nasdaq and ECNs offered something closer to 
immediate execution at the quotes in those markets, even if the same 
potential for price improvement was absent. As technology reduced 
investor reaction time horizons, sophisticated investors were less willing 
to wait the twenty-five seconds or so required for the exposure of orders 
on the floor of the NYSE. While traders weighed the cost/benefit analysis 
of this time/price improvement tradeoff, some, including Fidelity, worried 
that they were being taken advantage of more often by the specialist in a 
decimal trading system through possible abuses such as interpositioning 
and trading ahead.40  
A specialist’s obligation is to promote a fair and orderly market and to 
trade for his or her account only in the absence of other public interest.41 
For example, if the bid is $20 and the ask is $20.06, an incoming market 
order to buy would execute against the limit order to sell at $20.06 and 
incoming market orders to sell would execute against the limit order bid 
placed at $20. Specialists can intervene to produce price improvement for 
both sides by crossing the orders at $20.03, with the buy and sell orders 
each receiving a $.03 price improvement relative to the posted quotes. 
Interpositioning violations occur when two public market orders could 
reasonably be executed against each other without specialist intervention, 
yet the specialist intrudes by trading with one or both sides.42 In this 
example, interpositioning occurs when the specialist steps in to buy at 
$20.01 (meaning the market sell order received $.02 less than it would 
 40. John Hechinger, Fidelity Urges NYSE to Revamp Trading Operation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 
2003, at A1. 
 41. See Harris, supra note 9. 
 42. NYSE, Inc., Rule 476(a)(6) (forbidding conduct inconsistent with just or equitable principles 
of trading covers interpositioning), available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer, 
asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=/nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Exchange 
Hearing Panel Decision 04-051 (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf. 
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have under the result just described) and the specialist sells at $20.05 
(meaning the market buy order paid $.02 more). 
“Trading ahead” is a parallel behavior where the specialist exercises 
discretion during the few seconds available to seek price improvement for 
the order on the floor of the exchange. In a world characterized by 
investors calculating times in microseconds, this window provides a 
significant delay that can work in the specialists’ favor. Suppose a 
specialist with access to the cumulative order book has observed an influx 
of buy orders. In the few seconds that the specialist exposed the order to 
price improvement on the floor of the exchange, the specialist could trade 
ahead of these orders, buying for the specialist’s own account at a lower 
price and turning around and selling to the incoming buy orders at a higher 
price.43
B. Limits on the Ability of the Market to Respond 
The privileged position awarded specialists in an auction system has 
long brought with it increased regulation, both by the exchange as a form 
of private ordering and by the SEC rule-making and congressional 
prohibition; for example, Section 11(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Rule 11b-1 promulgated by the SEC limit interpositioning.44
Even within this legal system, much of the enforcement of these rules 
has been left to the Exchange as an SRO, a hybrid statutorily authorized 
part private, part public body.45 The story begins to resemble the episode 
that was previously described in the Nasdaq market. NYSE regulation, 
until early 2006, was conducted within the same not-for-profit entity as 
other activities of the exchange, including trading and the setting of listing 
standards.46 The membership of the exchange was comprised of the 1,300 
seat holders who expected to profit from exchange membership that 
included valuable trading privileges. The members, in turn, elected the 
board of directors of the Exchange, who selected the chief executive 
officer. The regulatory portion of the business reported to this CEO.47 The 
 43. See NYSE, Inc., Rule 92 (forbidding entering proprietary orders when unexecuted customer 
orders could be executed at the same price), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/help/Map/rules-
sys88.html. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78(k) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (2006). 
 45. See supra note 15. See generally Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial 
Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation during the First Seventy Years of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAW. 1347 (2004). 
 46. See NYSE, Inc., Governance of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (May 2003), 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/governancewhitepaper.pdf. 
 47. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of 
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controversy that followed disclosure of Dick Grasso’s almost $200 million 
compensation package triggered allegations that the regulation, or the 
absence thereof, of exchange specialists and other insiders was tied to 
attention paid to member firms whose executives were on the exchange’s 
compensation committee.48 With a relatively low-key enforcement regime 
and slow moving reform of the exchange’s governance and ownership 
structure, a market-based solution was limited in its ability to respond to 
concerns about the specialists’ system. 
C. Resolution 
Discontent on the part of institutional investors increased in late 2003. 
Fidelity, one of the largest institutional investors, called for an end to the 
specialist system.49 Calpers, the state retirement system of California, sued 
specialists for abuses similar to those discussed above.50 In 2004, the SEC 
brought enforcement action against the seven remaining specialist firms, 
which was settled with the firms paying more than $241 million without 
admitting any wrongdoing.51 In April 2005, the federal government 
indicted fifteen specialists on charges of illegally trading ahead and 
interpositioning, and fined the NYSE $20 million.52
Yet those responses pale alongside the impact from a more indirect 
source of law mixed with technology. Legal review of Grasso’s 
compensation, led by then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, led 
to Grasso’s resignation and a new governance regime, instituted by then 
NYSE Chair John Reed and new CEO John Thain, that separated 
regulation from other parts of the exchange operation.53 At the same time, 
Demutualization of Stocks and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367 (2002). 
 48. Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Asked Grasso if He Buoyed Stock, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2006, at C1. 
 49. Hechinger, supra note 40. 
 50. Laura Mahoney & Kip Betz, CalPERS Sues NYSE, Specialist Firms, Claiming Trading 
Practices Hurt Investors, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2128 (Dec. 22, 2003) (alleging misuse of exclusive 
right to trade stock, and that NYSE knew, but took little or no action against the firms). 
 51. Phyllis Diamond & Kip Betz, SEC, NYSE Specialist Firms Reach $241M Settlement Over 
Trading Practices, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 602 (Apr. 5, 2004) (agreement to pay $87 million in civil 
penalties and $154 million in disgorgement). 
 52. Kara Scannell & Aaron Lucchetti, Ex-Specialists Face Indictment for NYSE Deals, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 12, 2005, at C1. See Chad Bray, Aaron Lucchetti & Paul Davies, Two Ex-Van der Moolen 
Specialists Are Convicted of Securities Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2006, at A3 (reporting 
convictions for trading for their firm before they fulfilled customer orders). But see Government Drops 
Case Against Five NYSE Specialists, SEC. REG. L. RPTR., Nov. 22, 2006 (reporting results of fifteen 
indicted specialists). 
 53. Richard Hill, Reed Details Proposal for Revamped Governance Structure of Embattled 
NYSE, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REG. 1873 (Nov. 10, 2003); Stephen Labaton, Different Roles and Fresh 
Faces Promised at Big Board, NY TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at C1 (reporting overhaul of the NYSE board 
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the SEC was contemplating a significant change in federal regulation of 
markets under what was termed Regulation NMS (for National Market 
System).54 The key provision was a suggested revision to the “trade 
through” requirement, which until then had required traditional exchanges 
(but not Nasdaq, which was not then an exchange), as members of the 
Intermarket Trading System, to enforce price priority rules. These rules 
required that if the NYSE posted the best price, orders must be sent to the 
floor of the exchange even if that imposed potentially costly execution 
delays.55  
In the face of significant concern about the trade-off between price 
improvement and the speed of execution, the SEC put forward a trade-
through rule to apply to all public U.S. markets. The SEC asked for 
comment on two exceptions, one that would allow individual investors to 
opt out and another that limited application of such a rule to “fast 
markets,” an ambiguous term that carried the potential to exclude the 
NYSE because of the time required to expose orders to potential price 
improvement on the floor.56 After thousands of comment letters, the SEC 
promulgated final rules extending the trade-through rule to the broader 
markets but making it much easier for alternative markets to compete.57  
Within days of this action (to be implemented a year or more in the 
future), the NYSE announced a merger with Archipelago (one of the 
largest ECNs) that not only would move a large part of exchange trading 
to an electronic platform as opposed to the traditional floor-based auction 
system,58 but would also convert the NYSE into a for-profit publicly 
owned entity, as opposed to the non-profit mutual owned by 1,300 seat 
holders. Nasdaq, one day after the NYSE/Archipelago announcement, 
announced its own merger with Instinet, one of the key players among 
electronic communications networks, which would improve Nasdaq’s 
position in electronic trading.59  
and a regulatory structure reporting to independent directors). 
 54. See Proposed Rule Regulation NMS Exchange Act Release No. 34-49325, 82 SEC Docket 
758 (Feb. 26, 2004). Under the then-existing trade-through rule, a dealer was prevented from 
executing a trade with a client until that order has had the chance for price improvement at the 
specialist’s post on the Exchange. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Regulation NMS: Final Rules & Amendments to Joint Industry Plans, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-51808, 85 SEC Docket 1642 (June 9, 2005). 
 58. Aaron Lucchetti, Susanne Craig & Dennis K. Berman, NYSE to Acquire Electronic Trader 
and Go Public, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2005, at A1; See also Aaron Lucchetti, The NYSE: Faster (and 
Lonelier), WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007 at C1 (describing completion of move of much of the NYSE to 
electronic trading). 
 59. Nasdaq to Acquire Instinet, Apr. 22, 2005, www.nasdaq.com/investorrelations/faqs.pdf.
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Could these changes have arisen from market forces alone? Certainly, 
the NYSE had been considering public ownership for some time.60 In an 
era where other world auction markets have converted to an electronic 
platform and to public ownership, the likelihood of a market-induced 
change was certainly possible.61 Yet many of these considerations had 
been in place during a time when the NYSE was seemingly prospering.62 
Securing the required two-thirds vote of the 1,300 seat holders at a time 
when seat prices were rising would have been a challenge.63
The removal of Dick Grasso coincided with the widening impact on 
nonprofits like the NYSE of corporate governance reforms inspired by 
Sarbanes-Oxley. At the same time, the increase in electronic trading and 
other technological changes exposed specialists to a regulatory and 
economic discipline that they had never before experienced. The 
controversy that followed Dick Grasso’s resignation and the litigation 
against the specialists’ firms provided John Reed with the opening to 
radically change the structure of the exchange’s governance and John 
Thain with the opportunity to make even larger changes in the business 
model of the exchange. However, we believe that the rules changes 
imbedded in Regulation NMS spurred the structural changes in these 
markets. The role of law overcame barriers that opened the way for 
technology and competition, so that the NYSE, just like Nasdaq a decade 
earlier, is now much better equipped to deal with its competition, both 
within the United States and on the world market.  
III. ABUSES IN MUTUAL FUND MARKETS 
Mutual funds provide a third recent example of scandal in our capital 
markets, a scandal in which markets have had a larger role responding to 
the problem. 
 60. Kip Betz, NYSE Panel Examining Possibility of Switching to for Profit Corporate Status, 37 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 273 (Feb. 14, 2005) (reporting CEO Thain’s remark that the issue had been under 
discussion for some time). 
 61. Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J. L. & ECON. 437 (2000) 
(linking traditional nonprofit status to heterogeneity of suppliers of financial services which is 
changing with technological changes). 
 62. Seat prices for membership on the exchange had been at $2 million or more during 2003 
prior to the scandal but dipped to about half of that in 2004. See NYSE Historical Seat Prices, 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1135942555006.html. 
 63. Approval of a transaction such as the deal with Archipelago required a two-third vote of the 
members and occurred in December 2005, with the change becoming effective in early 2006. See Big 
Board Archipelago Members Approve Merger to Form For-Profit NYSE Group, Inc., 37 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. 2026 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
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A. The Problem: Traders Taking Advantage of Mutual Funds Via Late 
Trading and Stale Prices 
Mutual funds provide investors a vehicle to invest in a basket of 
investments made in stocks of companies that themselves are publicly 
traded. The value of shares in a mutual fund depends on the price of the 
underlying portfolio investments. However, trading in shares of mutual 
funds operates differently from the trading in shares or the equity markets. 
First, all trading in mutual funds is conducted with the fund; an investor is 
always either buying from or selling to the fund, in contrast to equity 
trading where another trader is the counterparty.64 Second, mutual fund 
shares are not traded continuously but are priced once a day (usually at 
4:00 p.m. Eastern, the time that equity markets close).65
These core characteristics gave rise to two abusive scandals that rocked 
the industry in the last three years: late trading and stale pricing. Late 
trading refers to a trader’s ability to buy or sell shares of the fund 
sometime after the close, but at the 4:00 p.m. price.66 Since the flow of 
information continues unabated (and may in fact increase) after the close, 
the mutual fund will be more or less valuable than it was at 4:00 p.m. An 
investor who can trade at the 4:00 p.m. price based on information 
released after the close can potentially earn an excess profit that will come 
at the expense of the remaining investors in the fund. The investor will not 
be able to realize the profit until the next time shares in the fund can be 
traded, which will be the close on the following business day, by which 
time subsequent events could have dissipated the trading gain. A rational 
investor would willingly take that risk since they have an informational 
advantage at the time of the initial trade.67 The ability to place a late trade 
requires the assistance of an insider who will permit your late trade to be 
included when all of the 4:00 p.m. trades are settled, and the active or 
passive acquiescence of the managers of the funds who decline to prevent 
late trading. 
Stale pricing refers to arbitrage opportunities that arise when a mutual 
fund’s portfolio includes companies outside the United States. The mutual 
 64. Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the 
SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271 (2006). 
 65. Securities law requires that the price be set once a day at net asset value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
22(c),(e) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-(1)(b) (2006). 
 66. See generally Eric Zitzewitz, How Widespread is Late Trading in Mutual Funds? (Nov. 
2004) (Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper), available at http://faculty-gsb.stanford. 
edu/zitzewitz/Research/latetrading.pdf. 
 67. Bullard, supra note 64. 
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fund will typically value these investments based on the closing price of 
the portfolio company at the closing in the home market. For Asian 
markets, this can be fourteen hours before 4:00 p.m. in New York, so there 
is the likelihood that events happening since the close of the Asian market 
will have changed the value of the portfolio companies that are not 
reflected in the New York—4:00 p.m.—closing price of the mutual fund. 
Investors employing such a strategy and trading with the fund thus will 
profit at the expense of the remaining fund investors. 
B. Limits on the Market’s Ability to Respond 
What made these strategies possible? Employees of mutual funds 
might receive sufficient incentives from traders to dominate incentives and 
duties from their employment relationship and lead them to permit late 
trading. More generally, every investor has financial incentives to take 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities across time zones or markets. In 
response, mutual funds might more closely supervise their employees or 
adopt pricing conventions that update stale pricing.68 Mutual fund 
shareholders, whose returns are harmed by these practices, are able to elect 
directors of the fund and could sue to seek such changes. But the 
collective action problems that apply to shareholders in corporations 
generally are even greater in mutual funds. The losses created by late 
trading are dispersed among each of the fund’s shareholders, so that the 
loss of all but the largest of trades may be hidden in the background noise 
created by other factors affecting value. Shareholders in mutual funds, 
which have no operations to supervise, are not sensitized to worry about 
governance issues. The monitoring role of directors in mutual funds has 
traditionally been even lower than in public corporations. The real control 
rests with the fund manager who has a contract with the board to manage 
the fund. These managers’ incentives to address these issues may be 
overridden by relationships with others in the industry who benefit from 
late trading or stale prices. 
C. Resolution 
Reports of these practices generated a series of responses. On the 
regulatory side, the SEC and state regulators brought a series of actions 
that resulted in disgorgement and fines. A settlement with Putnam 
 68. Some mutual funds did determine the 4:00 p.m. price based on estimated prices updated 
since the close of markets in other time zones. Bullard, supra note 64, at 1288 n.69. 
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Investments required $110 million to be paid to federal and state agencies, 
a change in top managers, and a reduction in fees.69 A similar settlement 
with Strong produced a payment of $140 million and the resignation of the 
founder and CEO.70 Other settlements against Massachusetts Financial 
Services and Bank of America/Fleet Boston produced even larger 
payments.71  
As a matter of prophylactic regulation, the SEC considered a number of 
regulatory changes. To the extent that structural barriers dulled the impact 
of market constraints, the agency was attuned to addressing those barriers. 
It sought to make the board a more active monitor of management, 
particularly if management’s economic incentives were not aligned with 
shareholders. The SEC implemented a new rule requiring that the chair of 
a mutual fund board must be an outsider, and seventy-five percent of the 
board must be independent (up from the fifty percent previously 
required).72 This relatively mild reform provoked a legal firestorm after 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce challenged the rule as beyond the 
agency’s power.73 A federal appellate decision held that the agency had 
not evaluated the costs and benefits as required by federal law and 
returned the rule to the agency.74 The SEC immediately re-promulgated 
the rule in the last days of Chairman William Donaldson’s tenure, 
provoking an intense political debate.75 After a second federal appellate 
decision ruled that the re-promulgation lacked sufficient due process, the 
SEC undertook additional hearings.76
Other regulatory changes contemplated by the Commission had even 
less effect. A proposal for a “hard” 4:00 p.m. close that would more 
intensely regulate the process by which orders for mutual funds are placed 
generated more than 1,000 comment letters and was abandoned.77 Worries 
 69. Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2226, 82 SEC Docket 
2225 (Apr. 8, 2004). 
 70. Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. IA-2239, 82 SEC Docket 3178 (May 
20, 2004). 
 71. Mass. Fin. Serv. Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2224, 82 SEC Docket 2036 
(Mar. 31, 2004). 
 72. See Investment Company Governance Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26520, 83 
SEC Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004). 
 73. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Rachel McTague, Glassman Named Acting Chair of SEC, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1141 
(July 4, 2005). 
 76. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (vacating rules that had been 
reproposed by the SEC). 
 77. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003). 
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arose that pension fund beneficiaries would be disadvantaged because they 
had to go through another intermediary with an earlier cutoff time. 
Investors on the west coast were concerned about the shortening of their 
time window to request redemptions in order to buy or sell. 
Proposals to control stale pricing were somewhat more difficult. One 
proposal to impose a two percent fee for short-term redemptions if shares 
were sold within five days of purchase generated substantial criticism and 
led the SEC to authorize but not mandate such a fee.78 A more detailed 
disclosure about fund policies toward market timing was put in place in 
2004.79
In the face of uncertain changes in legal rules and effective regulatory 
relief, the market sent a more direct signal that helped resolve the scandal. 
Several of the mutual funds that were most directly affected suffered 
massive outflows of capital; in Putnam the loss was up to forty percent.80 
In funds like Strong and Putnam, the long-time CEO and, in some cases, 
the fund founder, was forced out of the firm, and the firm sought a merger 
partner with a new and unsullied name.81
An empirical study by Choi & Kahan that tracked the outflow of funds 
in response to this scandal found a median outflow of $461.4 million from 
the funds during the first twelve months after a firm was linked to such 
behavior.82 Their comparative analysis of the outflow of mutual funds that 
were implicated in this scandal provides evidence that markets were acting 
effectively as a monitor of such behavior. Choi and Kahan found that 
scandal funds experienced a significantly greater outflow than other funds 
during the first twelve months after an initial report of late trading, stale 
pricing, or other misconduct. Measured by regressions and other empirical 
tests, they found that the outflow was greater for more severe scandals 
(proxied by the size of regulator settlements, the number of press articles, 
 78. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2 (2006). 
 79. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8406, Inv. Company Act Release No. 26,418, 82 SEC Docket 2357 
(Apr. 16, 2004) (requiring additional disclosure in mutual funds registration statements of their 
policies regarding frequent trading and disclosure of portfolio holdings).  
 80. John Hechinger, Putnam to Pay $110 Million, Try to Rebound, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2004, at 
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and the filing of government charges).83 In comparing different kinds of 
scandals, they found that the outflow was greater after late trading than for 
scandals with a less direct impact on shareholders (such as the IPO 
laddering complaints that arose about the same time).84 Choi and Kahan 
also reported that the outflow was greater when there was a penalized 
entity as compared to a penalized individual. They suggest this result was 
due to a greater risk that the shareholder would be hurt in the future; in 
addition, they found that outflow was larger for misconduct first 
discovered by then–New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as opposed 
to the SEC.85  
For purposes of this Article, the most interesting results derive from 
Choi and Kahan’s study of changes in corporate governance. Recall that 
the SEC required funds to separate their chair from their CEO and to raise 
the number of independent directors to seventy-five percent from fifty 
percent. Choi and Kahan compare funds that had those changes in place 
and found that factor had no impact on outflows. Shareholders who were 
more willing to withdraw funds if there was a scandal, and more willing to 
withdraw if the scandal was more severe, were indifferent as to whether 
governance rules were in place. The evidence suggests that for this 
scandal, unlike the previous two, market changes did not depend on 
governance changes. 
The governance changes, as described above, were only a portion of 
the regulatory changes that followed the scandals. To complete the 
comparison of law versus markets as cures for scandal, we should also 
seek to compare the relative impact of the market outflow versus the fines 
and disgorgements. Choi and Kahan again provide some useful data. They 
aggregate the settlements and fees that were assessed and compare the 
regulatory bite to the market penalty from fund outflows. Since the fines 
are assessed against the fund managers, and the outflow is suffered by the 
fund itself, they apportion the impact that the market penalty from the fund 
outflows is likely to have on the manager using the manager’s anticipated 
fee for funds under management. Choi and Kahan find that the average 
allocated settlement amount for each scandal is $22.1 million, and the 
average market penalty passed through to the fund’s management firm was 
$3.7 million. When aggregated for fund families, the settlement or fine 
amount is $96.9 million and the market penalty attributed to the fund’s 
management firm is $32.3 million. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
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These numbers appear to suggest that the monetary disincentive to fund 
managers from paying the fines was higher than the loss of income related 
to the market penalty of withdrawal by investors. Law is important, but it 
is the regulatory law, more so than the corporate governance. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
These three examples from recent scandals in our capital markets 
highlight the interdependent impact of the incentives provided by markets 
and by law. Each discipline brings particular advantages that are 
sometimes more effective than the other. An effective policymaker will 
want to use both, and a knowledgeable policymaker, with a foot in both 
disciplines, will understand when one has a relative advantage over the 
other. Markets have great self-corrective power and should be left free to 
evolve on their own. Yet, when there are structural barriers to entry or 
when the governance structure prefers one group of insiders whose 
interests are not kept in check through the effective use of the SRO 
framework, changes in legal regulation can unlock the full competitive 
power of the markets.  
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